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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 950772-CA 
v. : 
PENNY JO WALLACE : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a conviction of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, marijuana, with intent to distribute 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994), a third degree 
felony; unlawful possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine, with intent to distribute, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994), a second degree felony; and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37a-5(l) (1994). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1994) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is a valid warrantless inventory search of an automobile 
rendered invalid because the officer also had probable cause to 
search the automobile for contraband? 
2. Alternatively, did exigent circumstances exist thereby 
justifying the warrantless search of defendant's automobile? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's factual findings underlying its 
decision to deny a motion to suppress are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 854 
(Utah 1992) . Factual findings are clearly erroneous only if the 
trial court's factual findings are not adequately supported by 
the record, "resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's determination." State v. 
Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). A trial court's legal 
conclusions based on its factual findings, are reviewed for 
correctness, being afforded no deference. Pena. 869 P.2d at 939; 
Brown, 853 P.2d at 855. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES/ AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
Defendant, Penny Jo Wallace, was charged in an information 
with two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8 (1994), second and third degree felonies; one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37a-5(a) (1994), a class B misdemeanor; one count of failure to 
affix a drug stamp, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105 
(1992), a third degree felony; one count of operating or being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 
(1993 & Supp. 1995) , a class A misdemeanor; and one count of 
unsafe lane travel in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69 
(1993), a class C misdemeanor (R. 01-03). 
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Defendant moved to suppress all evidence discovered as the 
result of a warrantless search of her automobile by a police 
officer (R. 33). After hearing brief testimony from the police 
officer, the parties stipulated to the facts as set forth in 
their respective memoranda and as set forth in the police 
officer's written incident report (T. 4-5, 33). Upon hearing 
argument from all the parties, the trial court found and 
concluded that the search was a valid inventory search and that 
it was conducted pursuant to policy (T. 33-34) . The trial court 
also found that the vehicle had been left in the officer's 
custody and possession and that he had an obligation and duty to 
conduct the inventory search (T. 33-34) . The trial court 
therefore denied defendant's motion to suppress (T. 33-34). 
After a trial on August 23, 1995, a jury convicted defendant 
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, marijuana, a third degree felony; unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony; possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; and unsafe lane travel, a 
class C misdemeanor (R. 110-111). 
On October 5, 1995, defendant was sentenced to two prison 
terms for the possession convictions, one not to exceed five 
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years and the other from one-to-fifteen years (R. 143-46). 
Defendant was also ordered to pay $27#750.00 in fines and 
surcharges for the possession convictions (R. 143-46). For the 
possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, defendant was 
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sentenced to serve not more than six months in the county jail 
and to pay a $1,850.00 fine and surcharge (R. 143-46). Defendant 
was sentenced to no more than 90 days in the county jail and to 
pay $1,387.50 in fines and surcharges for the unsafe lane 
conviction (R. 143-46). All sentences were ordered to run 
concurrently, however, the sentences were stayed and defendant 
was placed on probation (R. 143-46). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the two 
convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to distribute and from the conviction for possession of drug 
paraphernalia (R. 148). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 17, 1995, defendant, Penny Jo Wallace, as driver, 
and her co-defendant, Roland H. Wheeler, as passenger, were 
involved in a one vehicle accident on SR-3 0 (R. 89). Trooper 
Arlow Hancock of the Utah Highway Patrol responded to the scene 
of the accident and found defendant wrapped in a blanket and 
sitting on the ground near her car (R. 89). Wheeler, also 
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wrapped in a blanket, reported to the trooper that he was in pain 
(R. 89). Trooper Hancock assured defendant and Wheeler that an 
ambulance was on its way (R. 89). 
After requesting that a witness to the accident provide a 
written statement, Trooper Hancock asked defendant for a driver's 
license, registration, and proof of insurance (R. 90). Defendant 
told the trooper that the requested documents were in her car (R. 
90). Trooper Hancock attempted to retrieve the documents from 
the car, but found the car doors locked, the engine running, and 
the keys in the ignition (R. 90). The officer informed defendant 
of this and Wheeler provided the trooper with a set of keys to 
the car (R. 90). Defendant then told the officer that her 
driver's license was in a brown wallet in her purse and that her 
purse was between the seats (R. 90). 
Trooper Hancock returned to the car, unlocked the door, and 
retrieved defendant's purse (R.. 90). He took the purse to 
defendant and opened it in front of her (R. 90). Defendant 
repeated that her license was in her brown wallet and the officer 
took the wallet out of the purse and opened it to find 
defendant's Utah driver's license (R. 90). Trooper Hancock asked 
if defendant had a registration and proof of insurance, to which 
defendant replied, "It's in the glove box, you should be able to 
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find it" (R. 90). 
The officer again returned to the car to look for the 
registration and proof of insurance (R. 90). Trooper Hancock 
entered the car through the passenger front door and opened the 
glove compartment (R. 90). At this time, the trooper smelled 
what he believed to be burnt marijuana (R. 90). While the 
officer was looking for a registration and proof of insurance, 
defendant and Wheeler were transported by ambulance to the Logan 
Regional Hospital (R. 90). 
Trooper Hancock then returned to his patrol car and 
completed an accident report form (R. 90). Trooper Hancock 
requested that Trooper Kendrick, who had arrived earlier, 
complete a field diagram of the accident (R. 90). 
Before leaving in the ambulance, defendant asked that the 
police call a towing company from Honeyville in Box Elder County 
(R. 90). The officers complied with that request, and a private 
tow truck was en route to the accident scene (R. 90-91). After 
completing the accident report, Trooper Hancock asked Trooper 
Kendrick to assist him in completing an inventory of the contents 
of defendant's car so that the car "could be released to the 
wrecker" (R. 90-91). 
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While Trooper Kendrick obtained an inventory form, Trooper 
Hancock once again entered defendant's car through the front 
passenger car and again smelled burnt marijuana (R. 91). Trooper 
Hancock opened a small wooden box on the floor in front of the 
seat (R. 91). The box contained a marijuana pipe, fine screen 
material, and rolling papers (R. 91). 
Trooper Hancock told Trooper Kendrick of his discovery and 
then requested dispatch to send an officer to the hospital to 
arrest defendant for driving under the influence of drugs and to 
obtain a blood test on defendant (R. 91). Trooper Hancock also 
asked that Wheeler be arrested (R. 91) . 
The officers decided to start their inventory at the trunk 
so as to complete the inventory in an orderly fashion (R. 91). 
In the trunk, the officers discovered a white plastic bottle with 
a metal tube in the side (R. 91). It had residue in it and 
appeared to be a marijuana pipe (R. 91). The trunk contained 
other drug paraphernalia such as syringes, pipes, glass and metal 
spoons, and a butane torch (R. 91). Located in the same box as 
the marijuana pipe was a chart of measurements and street terms 
for drugs (R. 91). The trunk also held a basket of men's 
clothing in which the officers found approximately fourteen 
baggies of marijuana (R. 91). There were also metal containers 
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containing numerous paper bindles, which contained a white powder 
believed to be cocaine or methamphetamine (R. 91). 
Trooper Hancock then called for a supervisor who witnessed 
the rest of the inventory (R. 91-92). After completing the 
inventory of items in the trunk, the officers moved to the 
interior of the car where they found papers containing a white 
powder that appeared to be cocaine, and several pornographic 
magazines from which the paper bindles appeared to be cut (R. 
92). The officers also found various other personal items and 
effects in the car (R. 64). 
The officers canceled the wrecker from Honeyville and called 
another company to tow the car for a State Impound (R. 92). The 
car was removed from the scene upon completion of the inventory 
and the wrecker driver was asked to keep the car in a secured 
area because of all the personal effects inside (R. 92). In 
completing the inventory, the officers followed written 
procedures of the Utah Highway Patrol (T. 10-12) and they 
completed a vehicle inventory form listing all the items, both 
legal and illegal, found in the car (R. 64) . 
Defendant complied with a request to take a blood test and 
was found to be under the influence of drugs (R. 92). Both 
defendant and Wheeler were then booked into the Cache County Jail 
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on charges of possession of illegal drugs (R. 92). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress because the evidence in question was discovered pursuant 
to a valid inventory search. Before the trial court, defendant 
affirmatively waived her argument that the inventory search was 
not justified under the circumstances. Even if defendant did not 
waive her argument, the warrantless search was valid because it 
met the criteria of a valid inventory search: 1) it was justified 
under the circumstances and 2) the officers followed standardized 
written policy in conducting the inventory. The fact that the 
officer had probable cause to search the car did not in and of 
itself make the otherwise valid inventory search a mere pretext 
for an illegal warrantless search. This Court should reject a 
"pretext" analysis in inventory search cases and rely only on 
objective criteria in determining whether a warrantless inventory 
search is valid. 
2. The officer could also legally search defendant's car 
because he had probable cause to believe that there was 
contraband in the car and exigent circumstances existed at the 
time the search was performed. Defendant concedes that the 
officer had probable cause to search the car. Exigent 
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circumstances existed at the time of the search because a private 
tow truck was on its way to remove the car from the control of 
the police officers. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS DISCOVERED PURSUANT TO A 
VALID INVENTORY SEARCH 
Defendant first challenges the trial court's denial of her 
motion to suppress on the ground that the trial court incorrectly 
ruled that the search was a valid inventory search conducted 
pursuant to Utah Highway Patrol [UHP] policy and procedure. 
Defendant essentially argues that the inventory search was 
invalid because 1) the inventory search was not authorized by 
statute or justified by the circumstances surrounding the initial 
stop as required in State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), 
(Brief of Appellee [Br, App.] at 7, 9, 11), and 2) the police 
officer had probable cause to search her car, thereby rendering 
the inventory search invalid as a mere pretext to illegally 
search the car without a warrant (Id. at 11-12)•1 
defendant's basic argument is that "the warrantless search of 
defendant's vehicle was an investigatory search for which a 
warrant was required and that the officer's failure to obtain a 
warrant prior to conducting a search of defendant's vehicle 
11 
It is well established that an inventory search is an 
exception to the warrant requirement of both the Utah and federal 
constitutions. South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 
3092 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski. 413 U.S. 433, 445-47, 93 S. Ct. 
2523, 2530-31 (1973); State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 
1985); State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1220-21 (Utah App. 1993). 
violated article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." (Br. 
App. at 6). As a general rule, this Court will not engage in a 
separate state constitutional analysis in the absence of an 
argument for a different analysis under both the state and 
federal constitutions. State v. Lafferty. 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 
5 (Utah 1988); State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 438 n.6 (Utah 1996); 
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 462 n.l (Utah App. 1991). Although 
defendant argues that article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution affords her more protection from illegal searches 
than the Fourth Amendment, she provides no analysis or rationale 
for that proposition. She cites to the plurality opinion in 
State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), and to State v. 
Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969 (Utah App. 1992) to support her argument, 
however, she does not explain why those cases require the result 
she desires. 
It is important to note that Larocco, which did not garner a 
majority of the Court, does not apply to inventory searches. 
State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Utah App. 1993). 
Furthermore, to date, the Utah Supreme Court has only employed 
the same analysis as that used under the Fourth Amendment in 
determining whether an inventory search is valid under the Utah 
Constitution. State v. Hyah. 711 P.2d 264, 267-69 (Utah 1985); 
see also State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Utah App. 1993). 
Because defendant has not proposed that her case should be 
analyzed any differently under the Utah Consitution, she has 
waived the right to have this Court apply a separate or different 
state constitutional analysis. See Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1247 n. 
5; E&m, 910 P.2d at 438 n.6; State v. Carter. 812 P.2d at 462 
n.l. 
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Both constitutions permit a warrantless search of a legitimately 
impounded vehicle to 1) protect the private property of the owner 
while the vehicle remains in police custody, 2) protect the 
police from claims of theft, loss, or vandalism, and 3) detect 
dangerous conditions or instrumentalities contained within the 
vehicle. State V, JghnSCT, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987); Hyah. 
711 P.2d at 267; State v. Gray. 851 P.2d at 1221; State v. 
Steraey, 808 P.2d 122, 125 (Utah App. 1991). 
For a warrantless inventory search to be valid, there must 
first be a reasonable and proper justification to impound the 
vehicle. Hyah. 711 P.2d at 268; Steraerr 808 P.2d at 124-25. 
That justification may come either from explicit statutory 
authority, Hyah. 711 P.2d at 268, or from the circumstances 
surrounding the initial stop or impoundment, id.: State v. 
JpfaigQn, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987); Steraer. 808 P.2d at 124. 
Once it has been determined that proper justification exists for 
the impoundment, the warrantless inventory is valid only if there 
is a regular set of procedures in place to adequately guard 
against arbitrariness and only if that procedure is followed in 
making the inventory. Hyah. 711 P.2d at 269; Steraer. 808 P.2d 
at 125. 
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Defendant does not argue that the inventory was not 
conducted pursuant to or in conformance with a regular set of 
procedures of the UHP. She argues only that there was no 
explicit statutory authority or other reasonable justification 
for police to inventory her car. 
iL Defendant jig preluded frcm challenging whether the 
inventcry search was justified under the circumstances 
because she affirmatively waived that point below. 
Before the trial court, defendant abandoned the issue of 
whether the inventory search was justified under the 
circumstances. In her memorandum in support of her motion to 
suppress, defendant appears to have challenged the validity of 
the inventory search on the ground that it had no statutory or 
other legal basis. However, at the suppression hearing, 
defendant conceded that if Trooper Hancock had not smelled burnt 
marijuana in the car, he could have legally conducted an 
inventory search (T. 6-7). The following exchanges between the 
trial court and defendant's counsel took place at the suppression 
hearing: 
COURT: What if Trooper Hancock had not noticed the odor of 
marijuana, did not have any reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause, . . . that there was some contraband in the vehicle; 
but in fact was conducting an inventory search because the 
vehicle had been essentially turned over to him to turn 
over, again, to a towing company, since the driver and 
passenger were transported, I believe, by ambulance to the 
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hospital. I believe those are the facts. He did have 
possession of the vehicle, he did call a tow truck, it did 
arrive and he conducted a search of the vehicle (T. 6-7). 
Now, absent any notice of marijuana or contraband, 
could he have conducted an inventory search of the vehicle 
legally (T. 7)? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think so (T. 7). 
COURT: Was the marijuana, or the contraband allegedly 
found, found in some manner inconsistent with an inventory 
search (T. 11)? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: UQ. (T. 11). 
COURT: It seems to me what you're saying is the officer may 
legally conduct an inventory search unless he thinks there's 
some criminality involved, and then he can't do it unless he 
gets a warrant (T. 12)? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You know, I think that's fairly close to 
what I'm saying, yes (T. 12). 
(Emphasis added.) (See attached Appendix A). 
As evidenced by the foregoing, defendant acknowledged below 
that but for Trooper Hancock's reporting that he had smelled 
burnt marijuana, the inventory search was valid. Having conceded 
that point, defendant solicited the trial court to suppress the 
evidence solely on the proposition that probable cause precludes 
an inventory search from being valid, n<?t on the theory she 
raises on appeal that there was no justification for the 
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inventory in the first place. In other words, defendant 
affirmatively waived the issue of whether there was a legal 
justification for the inventory search. She invited the trial 
court to not even address that issue, and to base its decision 
solely on whether the existence of probable cause made the 
inventory search a mere pretext for conducting a warrantless 
search, thereby invalidating the inventory. 
Having made that argument below, and the trial court having 
made its ruling based at least in part on defendant's concession, 
defendant should be prohibited from arguing now that the 
inventory itself was invalid. See State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 
1275, 1285 (Utah 1989)(defendant not permitted to seek to vacate 
sentence by alleging on appeal prejudicial error which he had 
affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived at sentencing -
hearing); State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987)(court 
would not review appropriateness of jury instruction where 
defense counsel affirmatively stated at trial she had no 
objection to that instruction). 
B. The inventory search was justified under the 
circumstances surrounding the search and the officers 
followed an established reasonable procedure for conducting 
the inventory-
Even if defendant did not affirmatively waive her argument 
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that the inventory search had no legal basis, the warrantless 
inventory search was still valid under the criteria set forth in 
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268, The defendant correctly states that there 
is no express statutory authority that permits a police officer 
to inventory the contents of a car left at the side of a highway 
as the result an accident. Therefore, the issue is whether the 
circumstances of this case justified the inventory. 
This case presents a somewhat unique fact scenario in that 
unlike most warrantless inventory searches, the police had not 
actually impounded defendant's car before beginning the inventory 
search. Rather, the police had been given possession and custody 
of the car by the defendant while they awaited the arrival of a 
tow truck, which police had called at defendant's request, to 
remove the car to a private garage. The police had been given 
the keys to defendant's car and had entered the car twice at 
defendant's request to search for her driver's license and 
registration. 
Even though defendant's car had not technically been 
impounded when the inventory search was conducted, the same 
policies that justify a warrantless inventory search of impounded 
vehicles apply in these circumstances. See State v. Sterger. 808 
P.2d 122, 125 (Utah App. 1991). Because the police received 
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custody of the car and its keys from defendant, and because the 
defendant was unavailable to remove her car from the roadway, the 
police were made responsible for the contents of the vehicle. 
Thus, the police were potentially liable for claims of loss or 
theft should any of the vehicle's contents be lost or destroyed. 
This Court, in circumstances similar to those presented in 
this case, upheld a warrantless inventory search as proper and 
appropriate. State v. Sterger. 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991). 
In Sterger, the defendant was involved in a serious one car 
accident in a remote area of southern Utah. Defendant left his 
car to find help. A police officer arrived soon after the 
accident. The passengers, who were critically injured, were 
transported to the nearest hospital. A tow truck then arrived to 
remove the inoperative vehicle from the road. As the car was 
locked, the police officer used a "slim jim" to open one of the 
car doors. He then began to inventory the contents of the 
defendant's car. During the inventory, the officer found a green 
leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana. The police 
officer had the vehicle towed to his home where he planned to 
finish the inventory. The day following the accident, the car 
was towed to a state certified impound yard, where the inventory 
was completed two days after the accident. Id. at 123-24. 
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The defendant in Sterger argued that there was no need for 
the police officer to take the car into custody, but that the car 
could have simply been locked and left it where it was. Id. at 
124. This Court disagreed and held that the surrounding 
circumstances justified the police officer's inventory. Id. 
Specifically, the Court pointed to the fact that defendant's car 
was partially blocking the road, the front windshield was 
shattered, the car was inoperable, and all the occupants had been 
taken away for medical attention. Id. The Court noted that 
because the police were authorized under those circumstances to 
take custody of the defendant's vehicle, "a concomitant right 
existed to examine and inventory its contents." Id. at 125. 
In the instant case, although defendant's car was not 
partially blocking the road, it was left off to the side of a 
state road and created a potential nuisance. There was no one to 
remove the car because all its occupants had been transported to 
the hospital for medical attention. The record does not reflect 
whether or not the car was inoperable, but a tow truck was 
called, at defendant's request, to remove the car from the side 
of the road. In short, the police were left with the care and 
custody of defendant's car and its contents. 
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In addition to these facts, and as defendant acknowledges in 
her brief, UHP written policy clearly states that vehicles should 
be towed or impounded n[w]hen removal is necessary in the 
interest of public safety because of fire, flood, storm, snow or 
other emergency reasons or for the safety of the vehicle and its 
contents." Utah Highway Patrol General Order No. 83-9, Revised 
July 1991, p. 2 (emphasis added)(R. 75-82, see attached Appendix 
B). Defendant has not argued that her car or its contents should 
have been left at the side of the road. In fact, she requested 
the officers to make arrangements for its removal. The accident 
and the subsequent removal of defendant and her passenger to the 
hospital constituted an emergency and the safety of the car and 
its contents necessitated its removal. 
Under these circumstances, the police were justified in 
following standard written procedure and taking possession of 
defendant's car and completing an inventory of its contents to 
protect defendant's possessions and to protect themselves from 
any claims of theft or loss. See Sterger. 808 P.2d at 124-26. 
C. The mere presence of probable cause does not invalidate 
an otherwise valid inventory. 
Defendant's second argument is that because Trooper Hancock 
had probable cause to search her car, the inventory search was no 
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more than a pretext to conduct a warrantless search and as such 
the inventory search was invalid. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an inventory search of 
an automobile is invalid when it is "merely 'a pretext concealing 
an investigatory police motive.'" State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 
268 (Utah 1985)(quoting South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364, 
376, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3100 (1976)); State v. Rice. 717 P.2d 695, 
696 (Utah 1986)(per curiam). In Hygh. the Utah Supreme Court 
refused to uphold a warrantless inventory search on the ground 
that the inventory was no more than a "pretext" for a warrantless 
search. 711 P.2d at 270. In conducting an inventory pursuant to 
an impound, the police officer in Hygh did not use an inventory 
sheet or make a list of the items found. The officers in Hygh 
did not follow any of their regular policies or procedures for 
conducting an inventory. It was clear from the facts in that 
case that the officer had impounded the car simply so that he 
could search the car for evidence that the defendant was involved 
in a reported robbery. 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court in Rice, refused to uphold 
an officer's inventory search which was obviously nothing more 
than a sham to cover for a warrantless search. 717 P.2d at 696-
97. The officers in Rice suspected the defendant of drug 
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dealing, but they had insufficient evidence to arrest him or to 
obtain a search warrant. Knowing that the defendant did not have 
a driver's license, the police waited outside the defendant's 
parents' home until the defendant got into his truck and drove 
away. The police signaled for the defendant to pull over and the 
defendant pulled into an office parking lot, which was located 
only a few blocks from his parents' home. Police refused to let 
the defendant leave his locked truck in the parking lot or to 
call his parents to retrieve the truck. Instead, the police 
impounded the truck and conducted an inventory search at the 
police station. Id. at 696. The officers in Rice had no written 
standards or procedures for impoundment of the defendant's 
vehicle and the State conceded the invalidity of the inventory 
search on the ground that the officers had no reasonable basis 
for impounding the defendant's vehicle. Id. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has refused to uphold 
inventory searches that are obviously no more than a pretext to 
conduct an illegal search without a warrant, it has never held, 
as defendant argues here, that an otherwise validly conducted 
inventory search becomes invalid merely because the officer has 
probable cause to search the vehicle. In fact, in at least one 
case, the Utah Supreme Court appears to have rejected that 
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proposition. State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986). In Earl, 
the defendant was arrested and his car was impounded at the 
police station. Prior to arresting the defendant, the arresting 
officer smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the 
interior of the car. The police officers discussed the 
possibility of obtaining a warrant to search the car, but learned 
that both justices of the peace were out of town. The officers 
determined that they would be following correct UHP policy and 
procedures if they conducted an inventory search. Id. at 804. 
The defendant argued that although the police officer had 
probable cause to search the car at the time of the arrest, the 
police could not search the car without a warrant after the 
automobile was impounded. Id. at 805. The Court summarily 
rejected defendant's assertion that an inventory search under 
such circumstances was pretextual in nature and that the 
discovered evidence must be suppressed under the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals relied on Earl in upholding an 
inventory search conducted after police tried unsuccessfully to 
contact the county attorney to obtain a search warrant. State v. 
Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Utah App. 1993). The officer in Gray, 
like the officer in Eacl# had probable cause to search the car in 
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that he had observed property that was reported stolen in plain 
view in the car that he had pulled over. Id. at 1210. This 
Court held that the fact that the officers had previously 
attempted to secure a search warrant did not invalidate the 
otherwise proper inventory search. Id. at 1221. See also State 
v. Stricklincr. 844 P.2d 979, 987 (Utah App. 1992) (assuming, but 
not deciding that even if pretext doctrine applied to inventory 
search, the officer's subjective motivation in wanting to search 
defendant's vehicle for evidence of a burglary was irrelevant). 
The fundamental problem with a "pretext inventory search" 
analysis as argued by defendant is that it focuses only on the 
subjective intent of the police officer, while ignoring the true 
issue of whether the inventory search is constitutionally 
reasonable. See State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1136-38 (Utah 
1994). Thus, under defendant's argument, an inventory search 
that is legal in every way is rendered invalid simply because the 
officer may have also had an ulterior motive to investigate a 
crime he suspects has been committed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected the application of 
"pretext analysis" to roadside detentions, Lopez. 873 P.2d at 
1140, and to warrantless arrests, State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 
1204-06 (Utah 1995). The Court reasoned in those cases that the 
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validity of a stop or an arrest must be analyzed on objective 
criteria, and not on the subjective motivation or suspicions of a 
police officer. Harmon. 910 P.2d at 1206; Lopez. 873 P.2d at 
1136-38. 
There is no sound reason, policy or otherwise, for applying 
a different analysis in inventory search cases. Thus, the 
primary focus of the court should be on whether the inventory 
search was properly conducted pursuant to the objective criteria 
set forth in Hygh, i.e., whether it is authorized by statute or 
justified by the circumstances and whether it is conducted 
pursuant to and in compliance with standarized procedures. There 
is no need to look at the subjective motivation of the police 
officer because when an inventory search is properly conducted 
pursuant to standarized procedures, the search is 
constitutionally reasonable. See State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 
1221 (Utah App. 1993). This rule is consistent with Hygh which 
invalidated the inventory search because the police did not 
follow the regularized set of procedures adopted by his 
department. Id. at 269-70. The subjective intent of the officer 
to search for evidence in Hygh. although alluded to by the Court, 
was therefore unnecessary to the result reached. 
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In this case, the objective, undisputed facts point to a 
valid inventory search properly motivated by the underlying 
purposes for doing an inventory search. The defendant was 
involved in an accident which resulted in her car being left at 
the side of a road and in the custody of the police until it 
could be moved. Defendant does not dispute that the police in 
this case followed their regularly established procedures and 
filled out an inventory form and listed all items, both legal and 
illegal, found in the car. The officers even asked the towing 
company they called after impounding the car to place the vehicle 
in a secure area because of the possessions that remained inside. 
All these factors support the trial court's ruling that this was 
a valid inventory search. The fact that Trooper Hancock also 
subjectively had probable cause to search the car does not change 
the validity of the inventory search. See Harmon, 910 P.2d at 
1206; Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1136-38. 
Because the inventory search in this case was justified 
under the circumstances and was conducted in compliance with the 
applicable police policy, it was proper. The trial court's 
judgment on this point should be affirmed. 
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POINT II 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE OFFICER'S SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S CAR WAS 
VALID BECAUSE HE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE CAR AND 
THERE WERE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
Although the trial court upheld the search of defendant's 
car as a valid inventory search, the trial court's ruling may 
also be sustained on the alternative basis that the officer had 
probable cause to search the car and there were exigent 
circumstances at the time the car was searched. An appellate 
court can uphold a trial court's ruling on any proper legal 
basis. State v. South, 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 5-6, 924 P.2d 354, 
356 (Utah 1996); State v. Galleaos. 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 
1985) . 
Under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, a 
warrantless search of an automobile must be justified by a 
showing of both probable cause and exigent circumstances. State 
v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1236-37 (Utah 1996). Defendant 
concedes that Trooper Hancock had probable cause to search her 
car because he smelled burnt marijuana (App. Br. at 12, 14). 
Defendant argues, however, that Trooper Hancock had to obtain a 
warrant before searching the car because there were no exigent 
circumstances. 
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In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that "exigent 
circumstances exist when 'the car is movable, the occupants are 
alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a 
warrant must be obtained.'" 910 P.2d at 1237 (quoting State v. 
Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978)(quoting Chambers v. Maroney. 
90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981 (1970))), 
In this case, exigent circumstances clearly existed at the 
time Trooper Hancock conducted the inventory search. A private 
tow truck requested by defendant was en route to remove 
defendant's car from the control of the police. See State v. 
Morck. 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah App. 1991). There simply was 
not time for Trooper Hancock to obtain a warrant before the tow 
truck was to arrive and remove the car. Once the car was removed 
from the accident scene, the contraband that Trooper Hancock had 
probable cause to believe was in the car could have been removed 
and might never had been found again. There was nothing to 
prevent defendant and her passenger from going to pick the car up 
later that day or to remove the contraband from the car or to 
call someone to remove the contraband for them. Id. 
Because exigent circumstances were present at the time of 




The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
should be affirmed because the inventory search was justified 
under the circumstances and conducted pursuant to written, 
standarized policy and procedures. In the alternative, the 
search should be held valid because the officer had probable 
cause and there were exigent circumstances at the time of the 
search. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS *f% day of December, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
LAURA B. DUPAIX 
Assistant Attorney General 
2
 Defendant suggests at the end of her brief that Trooper 
Hancock should have been required to obtain a telephonic warrant. 
The State is not required to show that the officers could not get 
a telephonic warrant; it need only demonstrate that exigent 
circumstances justified the search. State v. Morck. 821 P.2d 
1190, 1194 (Utah App. 1991). 
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P a g e 1 
1 Essentially the position of the defense is 
2 that Trooper Hancock apparently detected the odor of 
3 marijuana on his initial entry into this vehicle. 
4 That at that point he had probable cause to believe 
5 that there may have been contraband in the vehicle and 
6 needed to proceed to obtain a warrant. 
7 The Supreme Court of Utah has indicated 
8 that, in terms of the Utah Constitution, they would 
9 not parallel the federal constitution as it relates to 
10 warrantless searches of vehicles; and that they would 
11 require both probable cause and exigent circumstances; 
12 and that the exigent circumstances would involve the 
13 safety of the officer or destruction of the evidence. 
14 THE COURT: Let me digress for a minute. Let me 
15 ask you a question. I think I agree that that's the 
16 Utah Supreme Court's position, and this court's 
17 position, of course, because that's the state of the 
18 law• 
19 What if Trooper Hancock had not noticed 
20 the odor of marijuana, did not have any reasonable 
21 suspicion or probable cause, whatever it rises to, 
22 that there was some contraband in the vehicle; but in 
23 fact was conducting an inventory search because the 
24 vehicle had been essentially turned over to him to 
25 turn over, again, to a towing company, since the 
driver and passenger were transported, I believe, by 
ambulance to the hospital. I believe those are the 
facts. He did have possession of the vehicle, he did 
call a tow truck, it did arrive and he conducted a 
search of the vehicle. 
Now, absent any notice of marijuana or 
contraband, could he have conducted an inventory 
search of the vehicle legally? 
MS. LACHMAR: I think so, 
THE COURT: Why, then, does the presence of 
contraband, or an indicia of contraband, change the 
scenario? 
MS. LACHMAR: Because then you are conducting the 
search in order to investigate criminal conduct. 
THE COURT: How do you know? The question --
this is the gremlin in the case. If he figures, 
because he smells marijuana, that there may be 
contraband, then is his right or obligation to conduct 
an inventory search vitiated? He can conduct 
inventory searches only in the absence of any evidence 
of criminality? 
MS. LACHMAR: But sequentially here you have him 
detecting the odor of marijuana, burnt marijuana, and 
those facts were before him and only later did the 
scenario unfold with respect to them being transported 
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to the hospital and the vehicle remaining there. So 
it seems to me that he needed to — once those facts 
arose, he needed to act on those. Yes, later on the 
issue arose as to what to do with the car. 
THE COURT: When did he have to act on those? 
Because an officer is aware -- has a suspicion of 
criminal conduct, why, then, does he have to act on 
that? 
MS. LACHMAR: Well, I think because the 
individual's Fourth Amendment rights are triggered. 
In other words, if I as a police officer suspect that 
I've got someone who is involved in criminal conduct 
and I want to search their personal property, in this 
instance their vehicle, I think I need to jump through 
the hoops and obtain a warrant that the State 
requi res. 
I have individuals here whose property may 
— the search of whose property may result in the 
filing of criminal charges. We require that the 
State, or the police, obtain a warrant before they do 
that. Otherwise, because an inventory search is 
supposed to be free of and not done for the purpose of 
investigating criminal conduct at all. That is not 
part of it. It is done merely to protect a person's 
property and to protect the police from accusations of 
Page 8 
theft. 
It is not in any way intended to be used 
or to discover evidence which may ultimately result in 
the filing of criminal charges against a citizen. 
Therefore, they're not required to obtain a warrant. 
That's why there is no requirement for a warrant 
because they don't suspect and are not investigating 
criminal conduct. 
THE COURT: You used the term the rights are 
triggered. Aren't the rights always present? Does 
someone who is suspected of criminal conduct have 
greater rights than someone who is not suspected of 
criminal conduct? 
MS. LACHMAR: No. But it seems to me that -- I 
respect the fact that this is a difficult case, 
because what the court is saying isf look, it would 
have inevitably been discovered any way if he would 
have proceeded along and done the inventory search. 
THE COURT: I suppose ultimately that's a 
concern. If in fact there's an awareness of a 
possible criminality, does that require an officer to 
act in conjuntion with that or can the officer act as 
if there were no criminality, but upon other rights or 
obligations, such as an inventory search? Does the 
presence of possible criminality somehow enhance the 
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1 rights of the owner of the vehicle? 
2 For example, let's say these people 
3 crashed this vehicle, no involvement with marijuana or 
4 anything else. Their car would be subject to an 
5 inventory search given the facts of this case, right? 
6 MS. LACHMAR: Right. Well, possibly, yes. 
7 THE COURT: Once the car is turned over to the 
8 officer and said please have it towed, doesn't the 
9 officer have an obligation to conduct an inventory 
10 search at that time? 
11 MS. LACHMAR: I think they do, yes. Pursuant to 
12 their own rules, yes. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. If that's the case, then how 
14 is this scenario changed by the mere fact that there 
15 may be some suspicion of criminal conduct? 
16 MS. LACHMAR: Well, again, I point out that the 
17 inventory search — those inventory searches are not 
18 there to allow an officer to get around or skirt the 
19 requirement to obtain a warrant. They're not — 
20 there's no exception there for that purpose, to enable 
21 an officer to go ahead and search without a warrant 
22 when they suspect criminal conduct. 
23 Those inventory searches are narrowly, in 
24 my opinion, set out to allow an officer to protect 
25 property and to protect the police from theft charges. 
Because they're not investigating criminal conduct, no 
warrant is required, so they should be limited to 
those purposes. 
If you suspect, and initially here, I 
mean, the first awareness that this officer has in 
coming upon this accident is that he detects the odor 
of burnt marijuana. At that point -- I mean, let's 
say that there was no request to tow the vehicle, that 
there was someone there to remove the vehicle from the 
scene. Let's say that she had a friend driving 
perfectly sober and legitimate and could drive. Would 
Trooper Hancock have released that vehicle to that 
individual and said go on home, I have no concerns 
about this vehicle? 
THE COURT: Perhaps not, but I think the State 
may agree that there may be more of a requirement to 
seek a warrant, unless there's an exigent circumstance 
as under the Utah Supreme Court cases. But that's not 
the circumstance here, is it? 
MS. LACHMAR: No. 
THE COURT: Was the marijuana, or the contraband 
allegedly found, found in some manner inconsistent 
with an inventory search? 
MS. LACHMAR: No. 
THE COURT: Had the officer smelled marijuana, 
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but decided he wasn't going to say anything, or wasn't 
sure about it, or decided to keep it quiet, he could 
have conducted the search and would have found the 
same stuff legally. 
MS. LACHMAR: In other words, if he hadn't 
reported in his police report that he hadn't detected 
the odor of marijuana, if he'd just left that out of 
his report --
THE COURT: It seems to me what you're saying is 
the officer may legally conduct an inventory search 
unless he thinks there's some criminality involved, 
and then he can't do it unless he gets a warrant? 
MS. LACHMAR: You know, I think that's fairly 
close to what I'm saying, yes. 
THE COURT: Doesn't that protect people who are 
suspected of criminality and criminal conduct moreso 
than those who aren't? 
MS. LACHMAR: No. I think that that protects 
citizens from searches and seizures when they're being 
investigated for criminal conduct. It requires the 
officer to go and obtain a warrant when they are 
investigating criminal conduct. 
To me, inventory searches are not in the 
realm of -- they're not in the realm of protecting 
anybody except the police from theft. In other words, 
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Appendix B 
GENERAL ORDER NO. 83-9 
(Revised July 1991) 
TO: All Personnel 
SUBJECT 








Handling abandoned, stolen, seized, hold-for-evidence, 
improperly registered vehicles. Vehicles in a hazardous 
place or position, vehicles in an unsafe condition. 
Custodial care of such vehicles and contents. 
To establish procedures to be used when discovering vehicles 
as described in item one above and the proper care of such 
vehicles. 
To establish procedures for custodial care of the contents 
in, on or towed by any vehicle as described under subject, 
item two. 
Under the existing Utah statutes peace officers are 
authorized to remove and/or cause to be removed vehicles 
under the following conditions: 
a. When any vehicle is parked, stopped or standing on a 
roadway, whether attended or unattended, where it was 
practical to stop off the roadway*(U.C.A. 41-6-101). 
b. When any vehicle is illegally left standing on any 
highway, bridge, causeway or tunnel where such vehicle 
constitutes an obstruction to traffic (U.C.A. 
41-6-102[b]). 
c. When an officer has indications that the vehicle had 
been stol* or taken without the owner's consent 
(U.C.A. 4 6-iOZ[c][I] and 41-1-115). 
d. When a vehicle on a roadway is so disabled as to be a 
hazard to traffic and the person or persons in charge 
of such vehicle are unable to provide for its custody 
or removal (U.C.A. 41-6-102[2]). 
e. When the person driving or in control of such vehicle 
is arrested for an alleged offense for which the 
officer is required by law to take a person 
immediately before a magistrate (U.C.A. 
41-6-102[c][3]). 
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f. When the vehicle is being operated with improper 
registration (U.C.A. 41-1-115). 
g. When any manufacturer's mark or identification mark 
has been altered, defaced or obliterated (U.C.A. 
41-1-115). 
h. When a vehicle is found being driven on a highway in 
unsafe mechanical condition (U.C.A. 41-6-157). 
i. When a vehicle has been left unattended on a highway 
for more than 24 hours, it is presumed to be abandoned 
(U.C.A. 41-6-116[10]). 
j. When a vehicle has been left unattended on other 
public or private property for more than seven daysf 
it is then presumed to be abandoned (U.C.A. 
41-6-116[10j). 
k. When removal is necessary in the interest of public 
safety because of fire, flood, storm, snow or other 
emergency reasons or for the safety of the vehicle and 
its contents. 
DEFINITIONS 
1. Towed away: When a wrecker service removes the vehicle for 
the purpose of storage or safekeeping. 
2. Impound; When a vehicle is being held for legal reasons and 
the owner must fulfill certain legal requirements before he 
regains possession. 
3. Hold-for-owner; When a vehicle has been removed at the 
direction of an officer and the owner may regain possession 
at his discretion by assuming obligations incurred for 
towing and storage. 
4. Seized; When an officer takes custody of a vehicle which 
has been used in transporting any contraband items and legal 
ownership could be transferred to the State of Utah by 
appropriate legal action. 
5* Hold-for-evidence; When an officer takes custody of a 
vehicle and such vehicle is needed as evidence in any 
pending criminal action. 
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Urban area: For purposes of this policy, urban area shall 
be defined as the following: 
1-15 from the southern Utah County line to the 
northern Weber County line. 1-80 from the west Summit 
County line (Parley's Summit) to 7200 West in Salt 
Lake County. All other highways within the above 
described Wasatch Front area. 
Rural area: All other highways within the State of Utah. 
Road shoulder: A road shoulder is that portion of the road, 
contiguous with the roadway (trafficway) for accommodation 
of stopped vehicles, for emergency use and for lateral 
support of the roadway structure. By definition, this will 
include freeway emergency lanes. 
When a vehicle is taken to any police parking lot, impound 
lot or to any commercial storage lot, a case number shall be 
assigned and a written inventory shall be made of the 
contents of the vehicle, the trunk and any package, 
container or compartment. Such record shall become a part 
of the case file. When custody of the vehicle changes from 
one person to another, the person taking custody of the 
vehicle shall also assume custody of the contents by placing 
his signature on the inventory list. 
When a vehicle is removed on a hold-for.-owner basis, 
immediate steps shall be taken to locate the owner and 
inform him of the location of the vehicle and how he may 
regain possession. If the owner cannot be located within 24 
hours, the vehicle shall be impounded. 
When a vehicle is impounded for improper registration, 
stolen; abandoned or seized and impounded under provisions 
of 41-6-44.30 (Driving Under the Influence), the officer 
shall immediately complete a Utah State Tax Commission 
impound report, place the Commission copy in the appropriate 
envelope and mail to the State Tax Commission. After the 
impound report has been mailed, the officer shall not 
authorize the release of the vehicle without the express 
consent of the State Tax Commission. 
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When an officer takes custody of a vehicle for 
hold-for-evidence, the officer shall cause a notice to be 
placed on the vehicle stating that the vehicle is being held 
as evidence and also inform the storage lot attendant of 
this fact. The officer shall immediately inform the 
prosecuting attorney. Such vehicle shall be released only 
on approval of the prosecuting attorney or at the direction 
of the court. 
When a vehicle has been seized, the officer shall proceed in 
accordance with current procedure and law. 
a* Department of Public Safety form DPS 100 (Seized 
Vehicle Report Form) shall be completed and forwarded 
to the Commissioner's Office through the chain of 
command. 
An entry shall be made in the officer's daily log recording 
information as to location and disposition of all such 
vehicles and a separate entry with the same information 
shall become part of the case file. 
Costs of towing and storage of vehicles shall be the 
responsibility of the owner except for hold-for-
evidence and seized vehicles. In such cases financial 
arrangements for storage charges should be made through the 
prosecuting attorney. 
All vehicle keys shall remain with the vehicle and shall be 
surrendered to the owner or driver at the time the vehicle 
is released. 
BE USED 
Physically arrested persons 
a. In the event the driver or person in control of a 
vehicle is arrested and taken from the scene, the 
vehicle shall be under the control of the arresting 
officer and handled in the following manner: 
1) If permission is obtained from the owner or 
driver and if other manpower is readily 
available, the vehicle may be driven to the 
impound lot, police parking lot or the owner's 
residence, whichever is the most practical, 
keeping in mind the safety of the vehicle and 
its contents; or 
20 
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2) The officer may have the vehicle towed away on a 
hold-for-owner basis. The towing service will 
then assume responsibility for the vehicle; or 
3) The vehicle may be released to a responsible 
person designated by the arrestee after proper 
identification of persons and vehicle has been 
established. 
4) When the driver of a vehicle is arrested for 
driving under the influence, the officer shall 
comply with the provisions of 41-6-44.30 which 
says: 
a) If a category I Peace Officer arrests 
or cites the driver of a vehicle for 
violating 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10.-..The 
officer shall seize and impound the 
vehicle except as provided under 
subsection (2). 
b) If a registered owner of the vehicle, 
other than the driver, is present at the 
time of the arrest, the officer may 
release the vehicle to that registered 
owner, but only if the registered owner: 
(1) Requests to remove the vehicle 
from the scene; 
(2) Presents to the officer a 
valid driver license and 
sufficient identification to 
prove ownership of vehicle; 
(3) Complies with all restrictions 
of his driver license, and 
(4) Would not, in the judgment of 
the officer, be in violation 
of Section 41-6-44 or 
41-6-44.10..., if permitted to 
operate the vehicle and if the 
vehicle itself is legally 
operable. 
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Stolen vehicle 
a. Determine if the vehicle is to be held for evidence by 
contacting the police agency reporting the vehicle 
stolen. If practical, act according to the request of 
the reporting agency in determining disposition. 
b. If the vehicle is towed away or otherwise retained in 
custody by the officer, it shall immediately be 
impounded. 
Vehicles parked on highway 
a. Vehicles in traffic lane 
1) Have the person in charge immediately remove the 
vehicle to the nearest place of safety. If 
unable to do so, the vehicle may be immediately 
towed away. 
2) Take appropriate enforcement action. 
b. Vehicles on or adjacent to shoulder 
1) When an officer finds any vehicle parked on or 
adjacent to the shoulder of any interstate 
highway or any other highway which has a posted 
speed of 55 m.p.h., he shall take immediate 
steps to determine why the vehicle was parked at 
that location and the approximate time of its 
intended removal. If in the opinion of the 
officer the position of the vehicle does not 
constitute an obstruction of the normal movement 
of traffic, the vehicle may be left for a 
reasonable length of time not to exceed two 
hours in urban areas and four hours in rural 
areas. If in his opinion it does constitute an 
obstruction to traffic, snow removal or highway 
maintenance, he may immediately have the vehicle 
towed away. 
2) Any vehicle not in violation of subsection 1) 
above left unattended for a period in excess of 
24 hours shall be presumed to have been 
abandoned. After reasonable attempts to have 
the owner remove the vehicle, and the owner 
cannot or does not respond, the vehicle shall be 
impounded. 
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Vehicles parked on private property 
a. No officer shall remove or cause to be removed any 
vehicle parked on private property unless such vehicle 
has been found to have been stolen, abandoned or to be 
used for evidentiary purposes. A vehicle is presumed 
to be abandoned if left unattended on private property 
without the express or implied consent of the owner 
for a period in excess of seven days. 
b. In the event a vehicle is abandoned on private 
property, an officer should impound the vehicle only 
after having secured a signed request from the owner 
or person in lawful control of such property on Utah 
Highway Patrol Form HPF-5, "Request to Remove Vehicle 
from Private Property." Such request shall become 
part of the case file. 
Vehicles on highway with improper registration 
a. Vehicle being operated with expired registration. 
1) Issue a uniform complaint and summons. 
2) Instruct the driver to remove the vehicle from 
the highway until the proper registration is 
obtained. 
3) If, in the officer's opinion, the violation is 
flagrant, the vehicle should be impounded. 
b. Vehicle being operated with no registration or with 
registration issued for another person or vehicle. 
1) Issue a uniform complaint and summons. 
2) If, in the officer's opinion, the violation is 
flagrant, the vehicle should be impounded; if it 
is not impounded, follow a.2) above. 
3) If impounded, all improper plates and 
certificate of registration shall be removed and 
sent to the State Tax Commission with the 
impound notice—if not to be used as evidence. 
c. Vehicles parked with expired or no registration 
displayed. 
1) After reasonable efforts have been made to have 
owner remove the vehicle, handle in the same 
manner as abandoned vehicles. 
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6. Vehicles being operated in unsafe mechanical condition. 
a. Take appropriate enforcement action. 
b. When, in the opinion of the officer, continued 
operation would be unreasonable and excessively 
dangerous, the officer may require the owner or 
operator to remove the vehicle by means other than by 
being driven. If the vehicle is towed away, it may be 
taken to any location as directed by the owner or 
operator (U.C.A. 41-6-157 [c]). 
REVIEW 
This order shall be reviewed before December 31, 1995. 
Effective date March 1. 1989. 
Colonel S. Duane Richens 
Superintendent 
200 V, 
